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Development of artificial womb technology is proceeding rapidly and will present important 
ethical and theological challenges for Christians. While there has been extensive secular discourse 
on artificial wombs in recent years, there has been little Christian engagement with this topic. There 
are broadly two primary uses of artificial womb technology—ectogestation as a form of enhanced 
neonatal care, where some of the gestation period takes place in an artificial womb, and 
ectogenesis, where the entire gestation period is within an artificial womb. Ectogestation for the 
latter weeks or months of pregnancy could be possible within a decade or so, while ectogenesis 
for humans is far more speculative. Ectogestation is likely to significantly decrease maternal and 
neonatal morbidity and mortality, and so there is a strong case for supporting its development. 
Ectogenesis, however, may bring a number of challenges, including the commodification of 
children, and the pathologizing of pregnancy and childbirth. Its long-term effects on those who 
are created through this process are also unknown. In the event that it becomes ubiquitous, we 
may also find the central theological significance of pregnancy and birth diminished. The dilemma 
for Christians is that the development of ectogestation seems likely to normalise the use of artificial 




The development of artificial womb technology (AWT) is forcing a re-evaluation of numerous 
issues in reproductive ethics. As is often the case with new technologies, particularly those 
involving human reproduction, AWT will likely bring about some benefits but will also raise some 
difficult ethical and theological questions. It is therefore crucial for Christians1 to come to grips 
with its implications before they become reality, in order that they may form considered views on 
whether the development of AWT should be supported, and contribute wisely to shaping policy 
and legislation.  
 
AWT is likely to be utilised in two different ways. First, ectogestation describes the process where 
some of the gestational period would occur in an ex-utero artificial environment. For example, a 
woman diagnosed with a particularly aggressive uterine cancer at 19 weeks could have her fetus 
transferred to an artificial womb so she could undergo treatment. Ectogestation has already been 
utilised for lamb fetuses without any untoward outcomes for up to four weeks in what has been 
 
1 Our intention is to address both Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians, although we recognise that Roman 
Catholics have clearer guidance regarding assisted reproductive technologies that will likely restrict any endorsement 
to life-saving applications of ectogestation only. 
described as a ‘biobag’ (Partridge et al., 2017). More recently, towards the end of 2019, a team of 
researchers at the Eindhoven University of Technology was awarded a substantial grant to develop 
AWT (Davis, 2019). Ectogestation could feasibly be tested on humans within the next decade or 
so. Second, ectogenesis describes the creation of an embryo via in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), followed 
by the entire gestation period within an artificial womb. Ectogenesis is far more speculative than 
ectogestation, and it is likely to be many decades before it is possible.  
 
The benefits of using ectogestation in the latter stages of the gestational period seem clear—a 
reduction in maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality. Ectogestation also raises questions 
about what it means for a fetus to be viable, and so might impact the ethics of abortion. If a fetus 
can be safely extracted and moved to an artificial womb, abortion may become more difficult to 
justify irrespective of their moral status (Stratman, 2020). The availability of ectogestation may also 
add additional stigma to the decision to choose an abortion, as it offers alternative means of 
terminating a pregnancy without killing the fetus.  
 
Ectogenesis could bring several apparent benefits that Christians may initially find attractive. For 
example, it might offer a means to more easily deal with the millions of so-called ‘spare’ 
cryopreserved embryos generated by IVF and could help eliminate surrogacy. However, 
ectogenesis may continue the trends of minimising women’s gestational role and responsibilities, 
the commodification of children that was initiated by the introduction of IVF, and the gradual 
pathologizing of pregnancy and childbirth. Moreover, the long-term effects on embryonic and 
early fetal development are unknown, and the research required to determine such effects is 
ethically dubious. Also, conception, pregnancy and birth are of special theological significance to 
Christians and advocating technology that is capable of entirely replacing this process may 
eventually diminish our appreciation of their role. 
 
Here, we argue that while ectogestation offers significant therapeutic benefits with little downside, 
the case for ectogenesis is far less clear. Its ethical and theological implications are cause for 
concern. Accordingly, while we believe that Christians have prima facie reasons to support the initial 
development of AWT for ectogestation, we urge caution with regard to ectogenesis. We believe 
that the sacrifices involved are unlikely to be worth the gains. Of course, the dilemma is that the 
development of ectogestation is likely to normalise the process of artificial gestation, and therefore 




The purpose of conventional neonatal intensive care is to improve outcomes and reduce neonatal 
and infant morbidity and mortality. These goals are self-evident goods that should be understood 
to be respecting the imago Dei in some of the most vulnerable members of the human community. 
Improving the quality of neonatal care is clearly a goal that Christians can and should endorse. 
Ectogestation, despite some obvious similarities, is not ‘normal’ neonatal care. Neonates are 
prematurely born humans who are physiologically distinct from the fetus with respect to their 
oxygenation, circulation, haematology, metabolism and thermoregulation (Morton and Brodsky, 
2016), and who have different therapeutic needs to those being gestated. Fetuses which have been 
extracted and placed into AWTs—termed gestatelings by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis (2018)—have 
quite different physiological needs. Kingma and Finn (2020) describe this distinction by explaining 
that the gestateling is ‘born‐by‐location‐change’ but not ‘born‐by‐physiology‐change’, whilst the 
neonate is born by both (and the fetus by neither).  
 
The ‘biobag’ developed to gestate a lamb fetus for four weeks was done to assess the technology 
for future use in humans as an alternative to conventional neonatal intensive care (Partridge et al., 
2017). It is possible that human trials will commence within the next five to ten years. As the 
gestateling has been ‘born’ in an important and straightforward sense (Rodger et al., 2020; 
Colgrove, 2019), it seems appropriate to regard the ‘biobag’ as an extension of conventional 
neonatal care. Ectogestation using this technology will continue to require medical input from 
neonatologists and other clinicians during the process (Wozniak and Fernandes, 2020). Its 
limitations mean that the ‘biobag’ is unlikely to significantly change current survival limits in the 
short-term—to artificially gestate a fetus of less than 20 weeks would require a different 
technological and medical approach.  
 
This raises the question of what ‘viability’ means. According to Di Stefano et al (2019), ‘viability 
can loosely be described as the ability of a fetus or infant to survive independently of its pregnant 
mother’. A gestateling is certainly independent of its mother, and as we consider that the gestateling 
has been ‘born’, all gestatelings should be considered viable. In Di Stefano et al’s (2019) survey, 
88% of doctors agreed. Therefore, as ectogestative technologies improve, viability limits will 
decrease.  
 
One example of the therapeutic use of ectogestation would be in complications of pregnancy such 
as preeclampsia, which can have dire consequences for both maternal and neonatal health, and 
which results in 50,000-100,000 deaths globally (Oyston et al., 2015). In many cases the only sure 
treatment is immediate delivery, which in some cases is too early for conventional neonatal care to 
be effective. Ectogestation promises a far more effective solution in such cases where it is available 
and is not cost prohibitive.  
 
Ectogestation and abortion 
 
Once ectogestation is a reality, we expect that its continued development will gradually reduce 
viability limits, although as we have noted, a significant reduction will require considerable 
advances in medical technology. Provided that equivalent advances are made in the ability to safely 
extract fetuses from pregnant women, this raises the possibility that ectogestation may eventually 
become an alternative to abortion.  
 
Christians have traditionally condemned abortion as a deeply sinful action (Cherry, 2011), a stance 
that is recorded in two early second-century—or possibly late first century—documents: the 
Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas2, both of which likely draw upon even earlier Jewish sources 
from the first century (Mistry, 2015). The author of the Epistle of Barnabas implies that the human 
fetus is to be treated as one’s neighbour and abortion therefore must be rejected on this basis 
(Gorman, 1998). Care of the human fetus therefore has a significant historical and theological 
 
2 Both sources unequivocally state: ou phoneuseis teknon en phthora [you shall not kill a child by abortion].  
precedent in the Christian tradition. 
 
An important question for Christians, then, is whether the possibility of ectogestation will impact 
abortion practice. If we assume that extraction of a fetus incurs risks that are not significantly 
greater than those incurred by abortion procedures, then ending a pregnancy clearly does not 
require the death of the fetus. The Roman Catholic philosopher Christopher Kaczor (2011) has 
argued that this possibility would likely resolve the intellectual debate surrounding abortion, as the 
majority of the most prominent defenders of abortion—such as Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971), 
Mary Anne Warren (1973), and David Boonin (2003)—only argue for a right to extract the fetus, 
not a right to its death. If there is no right to the death of the fetus, then a consistent defender of 
abortion should embrace ectogestation as an alternative.  
 
There are several reasons why we believe this is unlikely to influence abortion practice, and indeed, 
Kaczor also expresses doubt that this will occur. Firstly, as Daniel Rodger (2020) argues, most 
women who have abortions do not wish to give their future child up for adoption, and would not 
voluntarily use ectogestation. Secondly, it is unlikely that women would be forced to do so, despite 
the fears expressed by some secular feminists (Langford, 2008). While there is ethical and legal 
precedent for the practice of ‘forced’ or court ordered caesarean delivery without the mother’s 
consent, this occurs only in very rare circumstances (Dyer, 2013; Morris and Robinson, 2017). 
Moreover, some philosophers argue there is a right to the death of the fetus (Räsänen, 2017)3, and 
so the intellectual debate may not be settled. Finally, many jurisdictions currently permit abortions 
beyond current viability limits, when it is clear that the fetus could survive without the use of AWT. 
 
Perhaps the most significant impact of ectogestation will be in the eventual reduction of viability 
limits. As Elizabeth Romanis (2020) notes, fetal viability features prominently in abortion 
legislation, and so if ectogestation entails fetuses of (say) 18 weeks are viable, there is potential for 
pressure to be applied to correspondingly reduce current legal limits for abortion. Unfortunately, 
in the countries most likely to adopt ectogestative technologies, most abortions would be 
unaffected by such reduced viability limits—in high-income countries, 90% of induced abortions 
are completed before the 13th week of pregnancy (Popinchalk and Sedgh, 2019). Ectogestative 
technology would need to be available much earlier during a pregnancy to act as an alternative to 
abortion (Rodger, 2020). Therefore, the development of ectogestation is unlikely to have any 
significant impact on abortion law for the foreseeable future, and so should not be an important 




Although ectogestation differs from ‘normal’ neonatal care, it has the same goals. Its potential to 
reduce neonatal morbidity and mortality is considerable and is a compelling reason for Christians 
to support its development. There are, however, two concerns. Firstly, as with any new medical 
technology, care must be taken to ensure human trials are conducted ethically. Neonates born 
before 28 weeks have a high chance of suffering complications such as bronchopulmonary 
 
3 For further discussion surrounding the right to the death of the fetus see: Mathison and Davis, 2017; Kaczor, 
2018; Hendricks, 2018; Blackshaw and Rodger, 2019; Stratman, 2020. 
dysplasia, and so if ‘biobags’ show considerable promise in preventing such conditions in animals, 
this might justify trials for extremely premature neonates (Wozniak & Fernandes, 2020).   
 
Secondly, supporting the development of ectogestative technologies such as the ‘biobag’, while 
providing obvious benefits, will in the long-term inevitably pave the way to the development and 
eventual introduction of ectogenesis. As we shall explain, we are dubious that ectogenesis will 




Ectogenesis, if it ever becomes a reality, will have far-reaching effects on conception, pregnancy, 
and birth. We have noted that its development is likely to be decades away, and so our analysis is, 
of course, speculative. It is important for Christians to consider these significant effects prior to 
its implementation, however, in order that we may be well prepared to propose or influence 
legislation. Although its use will initially be extremely rare, some human beings will eventually have 
the distinction of being conceived and gestated entirely artificially. We must therefore consider the 
consequences of moving towards a future where humans can enter the world detached from 
humanity, originating almost entirely from technology rather than human relationship.  
 
Firstly, let us consider some factors that may encourage the development and adoption of 
ectogenesis. There is a strong financial incentive for its development—Carolin Schurr (2018) 
reports that the global market for assisted reproductive technologies (ART) exceeded 22 billion 
US dollars in 2015, and this is projected to steadily increase. Ectogenesis is a natural extension of 
ART services, and the considerable funds that are currently directed towards paying surrogates can 
potentially be subsumed into the revenues of ART providers. 
 
Once ectogenesis is proven and available, several factors may encourage its adoption. If 
ectogenesis is shown to be safer or more convenient than pregnancy, it may become a convenient 
means of avoiding the burdens or sacrifices of gestation and childbirth altogether. An instructive 
example is the rapid acceptance of elective caesarean sections to replace vaginal delivery. The 
caesarean section rate is now as high as 55.6% in Brazil, 51.8% in Egypt and 47.9% in Iran (Betrán 
et al., 2016). A number of contributory factors have been shown to lead to the increased prevalence 
in elective caesarean section in Brazil, including level of education, maternal age and having health 
insurance (Eufrásio et al., 2018). This is despite delivery by caesarean section being associated with 
an increased risk of morbidity and mortality for both mother and child (Mylonas and Friese, 2015; 
Souza et al., 2010)4. If ectogenesis offered an alternative means of gestation that did not involve 
any of the inherent risks associated with ‘natural’ gestation and childbirth, then those with the 
resources to do so may increasingly utilise it. 
 
Social pressures may also help to speed its adoption. Secular bioethicists such as Anna Smajdor 
(2007) believe that developing and utilising ectogenesis is a justice issue—a way to relieve women 
 
4 Though we also acknowledge that there exists significant inequality with respect to access to life-saving obstetric 
interventions like caesarean section for women in many middle- and low-income countries. This significant 
inequality is part of the reason why women in middle- and low-income countries account for 99% of maternal 
mortality (Filippi et al, 2016). 
of the inherent burdens and risks of pregnancy and childbirth. Smajdor argues that ectogenesis 
would help to ensure that women with access to this technology can reproduce as men do, without 
risking their physical and mental health as well as avoiding the significant demands that pregnancy 
places on their bodily autonomy. Evie Kendal (2015) has made a similar point, arguing that 
ectogenesis is necessary to bring about sexual equality in reproduction by liberating women from 
the existing burdens of pregnancy and childbirth.  
 
If ectogenesis does become a reality, we expect that as it is more widely adopted, it will have an 
increasing impact in several key areas, and so the consequences require careful consideration by 




As ectogenesis will require the use of IVF to obtain a zygote, it will be an important part of the 
process. If ectogenesis becomes widespread, we expect this will result in an increase in its use. 
However, there are well known ethical and theological concerns with IVF, which we outline below, 
and the benefits ectogenesis might bring do not alleviate these concerns. 
 
Firstly, the Roman Catholic Church argues that IVF detaches the conjugal act from the procreative 
act, and should therefore not be permitted (Catechism of the Catholic Church; Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987). So, Roman Catholics will be unable to support the development 
of ectogenesis. Secondly, IVF leads to the destruction of embryos, as typically more are created 
than actually used, and increasingly preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is used to select 
embryos for implantation. Combining both is now common practice and entails that couples can 
avoid giving birth to children with known genetic disease. This practice risks turning children into 
a commodity that must meet certain standards, rather than a blessing or gift from God. 
Additionally, as Gilbert Meilaender (2019) has argued, producing humans through IVF and PGD 
undermines the notion of human equality: when you create something, you get to decide its worth, 
rather than merely being thankful that it exists. 
 
Thirdly, IVF has resulted in the creation of vast numbers of so-called ‘spare’ embryos, which in 
the United States alone are estimated to number between 600,000 and 1,000,000 (Zimon et al., 
2019). In one study, 37% of respondents stated they had no intention of using their cryopreserved 
embryos whilst a further 39% remained undecided (Deniz et al., 2016). From a Christian 
perspective, these embryos are equally valuable human beings created in concert with God, and 
made in the imago Dei. Embryo destruction and long-term cryopreservation are therefore 
horrendous acts.  
 
It is possible that ectogenesis could be used to gestate some of the many cryopreserved embryos 
for the purposes of adoption. In fact, David Reiber (2010) argues that from a Roman Catholic 
perspective, the only ethically licit use of ectogenesis would be for rescuing abandoned 
cryopreserved embryos. As a human being already exists, the question of violating the conjugal act 
is moot. There are only three options for preserving the life of the embryo—remaining 
cryopreserved; being gestated by the biological mother; or donated and gestated by someone else. 
Only the latter two options provide a means of being gestated, born and the opportunity to live. 
Moreover, leaving embryos in their cryopreserved state leaves them at an increased risk of being 
destroyed for research purposes or discarded. If the biological parents have abandoned or are 
unable to gestate them then the only remaining option is embryo adoption. Stephen Napier has 
argued that although the Catholic Church states that a child has the right to be gestated by his or 
her own parents, it is the parents who have violated this right by utilising IVF and then abandoning 
them (Napier and Haas, 2009). If the duty to be gestated by one's biological parents can no longer 
be fulfilled, then embryo adoption becomes an act of Christian love and sacrifice to a vulnerable 
member of the human community. Over the last decade there has been a sharp increase in the 
number of Christians opting to adopt embryos with many utilising theological themes as 
justification (Cromer, 2018).  
 
The crucial question for Christians is whether ectogenesis is the most suitable option for doing so. 
There are several reasons why it is unlikely to be. Firstly, for the foreseeable future it will be far 
more affordable to implant ‘spare’ donated embryos into women willing to gestate and adopt them. 
Secondly, it seems likely that the widespread adoption of ectogenesis required for it to be available 
for this purpose will generate at least as many unused embryos as it might rescue, as it will 
encourage the use of IVF as well as PGD. So, ectogenesis is likely to contribute to the ‘spare’ embryo 
problem rather than helping to alleviate it. Of course, ectogenesis will also permit women who are 
unable to gestate or for whom it may be dangerous to do so to have their own children without 
using a surrogate. This will avoid various ethical and theological concerns with surrogacy which 
we discuss below, but as we have noted, it is unlikely to be affordable by most and will not have a 
significant impact. 
 
There is one final concern regarding ectogenesis and IVF—in many countries it is not legally 
permitted to keep or use an in vitro embryo more than 14 days after fertilisation. Obviously, for 
ectogenesis to become a reality, such laws will need to be altered as the embryo will never be 
implanted. The consequence, however, may be that researchers are freed to experiment on 





There are several ethical issues regarding the use of surrogacy to have children, in addition to those 
noted for IVF. General concerns include the potential commodification of women, disruption of 
the maternal-gestational bond, and exploitation of women as paid incubators. Surrogacy is 
expensive, costing at least $50,000 in the United States (Scherman et al, 2016), and given a 
commercial surrogate is potentially sacrificing her health for financial gain, perhaps exploitation is 
inevitable—particularly if surrogates from less wealthy countries are used. According to Clara 
Watson (2016), in some cases surrogacy has even been linked with human trafficking, and as a 
result India has banned commercial surrogacy. All of these issues are of concern to Christians. 
 
Some theological traditions have additional issues with surrogacy: for example, the Roman 
Catholic Church states that ‘surrogate motherhood represents an objective failure to meet the 
obligations of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible motherhood’ (Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987). Most Protestant traditions, while also disapproving of 
surrogacy, tend to restrict their ethical concerns to the welfare of the surrogate and the effect on 
the child—they do not usually share Catholic concerns regarding the separation of sex and 
reproduction, as evidenced by their widespread acceptance of IVF5.  
 
If ectogenesis becomes a reality it will likely significantly reduce the demand for surrogates, 
alleviating concerns regarding the exploitation of women to satisfy people’s desire for children. 
Although ectogenesis will likely be very expensive, it may well be similar to the costs of surrogacy, 
and eventually, could eliminate surrogacy altogether. Roman Catholics will remain opposed to 
ectogenesis because of its reliance on IVF; for most Protestants, the likely reduction in demand 
for surrogates provides a significant reason to support its development. 
 
Once ectogenesis provides an alternative to surrogacy, the removal of ethical and legal barriers to 
conceiving a child without a parent gestating it may result in an increase in the use of donated 
gametes. This increases concerns regarding the commodification of children. The combination of 
IVF, PGD and CRISPR gene editing technology is a particular worry, as it could permit the 
creation of enhanced humans. Of course, these technologies are or will soon be available for any 
IVF conception, including surrogacies, so ectogenesis is not unique in this regard.  
 
Pregnancy and birth 
 
Gestation is an experience universally shared by all human beings, and in the distant future, 
ectogenesis may eventually make it obsolete, making women unnecessary. Given that ectogenesis 
is many decades away, and its costs are likely to confine its use to the wealthy, ubiquitous adoption 
of ectogenesis seems unlikely. However, it is worth speculating on the consequences of this 
occurring, even if the probability of this is small.  
 
There are two important aspects to consider—the special theological significance of conception, 
pregnancy and birth, and the broader ethical implications. Firstly, let us consider the Incarnation, 
the central event in the Christian faith. Here, God somehow became a human being, with the 
intimate cooperation of Mary and the Holy Spirit. Mary carried the Christ Child for nine months, 
nurturing and protecting Him, and finally going through the pain of labour to bring Him into this 
world. Therefore, Jesus Himself went through the same process of prenatal development and birth 
that all human beings do. John states, ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt among us’ (Jn. 1:14), 
while Paul states that ‘in Him all the fullness of Deity dwells in bodily form’ (Col. 2:9). The 
Incarnation is a unique and profound mystery. 
 
More generally, Janet E. Smith (2002) explains that parents ‘cooperate with God the Creator in 
conceiving and giving birth to a new human being’. God himself is drawn into the procreative love 
act, again in an utterly mysterious way. The ensuing child is a gift from God, and we have no 
control over the child’s characteristics. In fact, pregnancy and childbirth is marked by its 
unpredictability, from the sex of the child to the timing of its arrival. We do know, however, that 
every child bears the imago Dei, being made by Him in His image. Pregnancy and birth are also 
marked by suffering—a sign that we are sinners in need of a Saviour (Gen. 3:15). It is also 
 
5 Best et al (2019) found that over 70% of Protestant Christians in their survey approved of IVF.  
important to note that fetuses are themselves described in similar terms to those that have been 
born. In the New Testament the Greek term Brephos [βρέφος] is used to describe those in utero 
(Luke 1:41, 44) as well as those that have completed gestation (Luke 2:12, 16; Acts 7:19).  
 
Birth is also an important Biblical metaphor. Marking a radical transformation from one state to 
another, it is used to represent the Christian conversion experience: in John 3:3-5 Jesus famously 
tells the Pharisee, Nicodemus, that ‘you must be born again’, and rather than being born again of 
the flesh, he must be ‘born of the Spirit’. John later builds on this theme in his first epistle, making 
numerous references to being ‘born of God’ (1 John 3:9, 4:7, 5:1, 5:4, 5:18). Peter tells his readers 
that ‘he has given us new birth into a living hope’ (1 Peter 1:3) and that ‘you have been born again, 
not of perishable seed, but of imperishable, through the living and enduring word of God’ (1 Peter 
1:23). James writes that ‘he chose to give us birth through the word of truth, that we might be a 
kind of first fruits of all he created’ (James 1:18). The pain of childbirth is also widely used as a 
metaphor in Biblical eschatology. Jeremiah 30 talks of the birth pains preceding the restoration of 
Israel. Matthew 24 and Mark 13 describe wars, earthquakes, and famines as the birth pains 
preceding our final redemption. Romans 8 describes the whole of creation as suffering birth pains 
while awaiting its liberation from decay. The implication is that the predicted events, like child 
birth itself, must run their course until completion. Suffering will eventually cease, and the joy that 
accompanies childbirth will follow.  
 
If ectogenesis replaces conception, pregnancy and birth, our familiarity with these processes may 
diminish over time; eventually, our appreciation and understanding of their theological significance 
may also fade. Natural birth could well become a curiosity or quaint tradition, robbing the 
metaphor of its power to emphasise a radical transformation from one form of life to another. 
The timing of childbirth is usually a dramatic event beyond our ability to control, and we are 
uncertain of the outcome for both mother and child until it is complete. For many parents, it is a 
reminder of their powerlessness over one of life’s most significant events—Christian parents must 
place their trust in God regarding the outcome. By contrast, ectogenesis will involve considerably 
more human control—both over conception, the time of birth and the expected outcome. The 
child will be fully known prior to birth, and so almost all the uncertainty and mystery of gestation 
and birth will be eliminated. It may be that, over time, this influences our understanding of 
Christian conversion, highlighting our role and diminishing the notion of God’s intimate 
involvement in creating human beings. It will teach us that we have the power to create ourselves, 
rather than being children of God. This may well erode the concept of us as being made in the 
image of God—the imago Dei—and perhaps even dull our appreciation of the fatherhood of God. 
 
A related concern is that ectogenesis will contribute to a view of pregnancy and childbirth as 
pathological conditions that should be eliminated. We have already noted Kendall and Smajdor’s 
view that females need to be liberated from pregnancy. This view is most clearly represented in 
the feminist Shulamith Firestone’s (2015) claim in her 1970 book The Dialectic of Sex that ‘pregnancy 
is barbaric’ and the predominant source of women’s oppression. This is in stark contrast to the 
Christian view of pregnancy and birth, where pregnancy is understood as a blessing and the bearing 
of children as a source of joy. Numerous women throughout the Bible, such as Rachel, Hannah, 
and Elizabeth are described for a time as being unable to bear children and that this was 
experienced as a source of grief and lament (Gen 30:1; 1 Sam 1:15; Luke 1:23-25). Despite 
pregnancy being described as a blessing from God, the pain, anguish and suffering that can 
accompany childbirth are neither ignored or understated. Rather than seeing pregnancy as 
something to avoid, many Christian women experience pregnancy and childbirth as an opportunity 
to participate with God in the process of creation (Ditmore, 2008), in what is a uniquely female 
experience.  
 
It is true that many women do face oppressive social, physical, and economic disadvantages due 
to pregnancy and childbirth. In our view, however, if the goal is to promote justice, then any 
intervention to alleviate these disadvantages ought to be centered on those women that 
overwhelmingly experience these burdens. Given the likelihood that ectogenesis will only benefit 
the wealthy, it is implausible to consider that it would meet this criterion. As Horner (2020) notes, 
ectogenesis might help us imagine a world where women are not disadvantaged by pregnancy and 
childbirth, and we should work to make that world a reality without pinning our hopes on 
ectogenesis.  
 
A related claim is that ectogenesis could serve as a therapeutic process that will reduce the risks 
and complications of pregnancy and childbirth, saving women’s lives. Christians have a long 
history of providing medical care to those in need. Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 
10:25–37) instructed Christians to care for those in physical need; Matthew 25:36 commends those 
who look after the sick. The mandate is not explicitly framed as an issue of justice, but rather as a 
compassionate act where we represent the hands and feet of Jesus himself in providing for people’s 
physical needs. Gerald Arbuckle (2013) describes the parable of the Good Samaritan as the 
founding myth of the western healthcare tradition that has inspired people through the ages to 
care for the disadvantaged and forgotten. Throughout the Bible, however, God is described as 
being deeply concerned with bringing justice to the world (Isaiah 30:18; Psalm 11:7; Psalm 103:6), 
and providing healthcare for those in need can be seen as part of that mission. However, as we 
have noted, ectogenesis is likely to be an extremely expensive endeavour only available to the 
wealthy. Women from low-income countries, who are already at an increased risk of maternal 
morbidity and mortality (Filippi et al., 2016; Girum and Wasie, 2017) would be the least likely to 
access or afford ectogenesis. Access to ectogenesis is likely to become another means of 
compounding the existing disparities in the distribution of maternal morbidity and mortality 
(Horn, 2020). Low- and middle-income countries already account for 99% of global maternal 




Finally, there are some additional ethical concerns raised by ectogenesis. The long-term effects of 
artificial gestation on human fetuses—absent of any gestation in an in-utero environment—are 
obviously unknown at present, given the nascent status of AWT. There are potentially physical 
and psychological harms that could result from a failure to effectively replicate the maternal 
environment. Perhaps the fetal-maternal bond will be negatively affected. There is also evidence 
to show that longer gestation at birth is associated with benefits for neurodevelopment and that 
shortened gestation can disrupt neurodevelopment that can have a lifelong impact (Davis et al., 
2011; Espel et al., 2014), such as negatively affecting motor skills and academic achievement 
(Noble et al., 2012; Espel et al., 2014). These harms—especially the neurodevelopmental—may 
not be fully realised until numerous humans have undergone the process, by which time thousands 
of children could be subject to a deprived human existence (Singer and Wells, 2006). Similar 
concerns were raised against the use of IVF; however, these concerns have now been shown to be 
largely unwarranted. The difference in this case is the marked time differences involved, the former 
requiring just days of human development outside of the maternal environment whilst the latter 
requires several months. Nevertheless, lamb fetuses gestated for several weeks in the ‘biobag’ did 
not show any apparent neurological deficit, however the researchers acknowledged there were 
limitations in their assessment of neurologic function (Partridge et al., 2017).  
 
Another concern is that children ‘born’ via ectogenesis are dehumanised—treated as somehow 
less than human because of their origins. Elford and Jones (2010) point out that this has not proven 
to be the case for IVF children—they note that despite over 3 million IVF babies having been 
born, no adverse social effects of IVF have been demonstrated. Given the similarities, it seems 
likely that if ectogenesis becomes as commonplace as IVF, it is also doubtful that ectogenic 
children will suffer any negative social effects, and especially so if it one day becomes ubiquitous. 
There is some evidence from a large prospective cohort study that IVF is associated with a small 
but statistically significant risk of intellectual disability, although the absolute risk of this remains 
low (Sandin et al., 2013). A related worry is that children will be denied an experience that every 
human being has undergone and are somehow deprived as a result. Unless measurable physical or 
psychological harm is demonstrable, it is unclear what being deprived of the gestation experience 
actually means for a child—after all, for most of this period they lack consciousness, and reflective 
self-awareness is not achieved until at least 15-18 months (Brownell et al., 2007).  
 
Dystopian concerns such as the ‘Brave New World’ scenario described by Aldous Huxley—where 
humans are created and raised in ‘hatcheries’ and ‘conditioning centres’—seem far-fetched but 
need to be considered. Given the control societies such as China have at times exerted over 
reproduction—where a one child policy was in effect between 1979-2015—it is certainly possible 




Ectogestative technology is rapidly advancing and it may be only a few years until it radically 
transforms neonatal care, pushing back human viability, and reducing the existing morbidity and 
mortality rates for premature neonates. These are compelling benefits, given the current poor 
prognosis for premature neonates, and there is a prima facie case for Christians to support its 
development. Unfortunately, Christians are presented with a dilemma—development of 
ectogestation will almost inevitably open the path to the development of ectogenesis, even if its 
availability is likely to be decades in the future and dependent on overcoming various scientific 
challenges. This is problematic, as the case for ectogenesis is ethically dubious from a Christian 
perspective. Benefits such as the eventual elimination of surrogacy are countered by a likely 
increase in the use of IVF, resulting in more cryopreserved embryos, as well as another avenue for 
the potential commodification of children. Its cost means ectogenesis is unlikely to serve any 
purpose in a social justice context, and we have argued that ectogestation is unlikely to significantly 
impact the abortion debate. Ectogenesis also raises worries of a dystopian future where all human 
beings are artificially gestated, and women and men are no longer required for reproduction.  
 
Apart from these issues, there are theological concerns for Christians. Christianity places a high 
value on God’s intimate involvement in our creation as human beings, and ectogenesis threatens 
to undermine this value. It also may eventually diminish our hermeneutics of conception, 
pregnancy, and birth as key Biblical metaphors. Of course, concerns regarding a society where 
ectogenesis is ubiquitous are speculative, and it will only be possible with many years of hindsight 
to determine their legitimacy. It seems unlikely that traditional pregnancy and birth will be entirely 
eliminated; however, it remains a possibility, and Christians should keep this in mind when 
considering their support for this technology. It behoves us to keep well informed regarding the 
development of AWT, and endeavour to be involved in its regulation before its use becomes 
widespread, as once technology is unleashed, it becomes difficult to control and regulate. IVF is a 
case in point—its original intention was to allow young childless couples to have children when 
other options were exhausted (Biggers, 2012). Now, IVF is being used for single women to use 
anonymous sperm donors to have children, and others to delay childbearing, both of which are 
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